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The OpenNet Initiative has been testing Internet filtering around the world for over five years.  The 
incidence of filtering in these five years has expanded from a small number of states, including 
China, Iran and Saudi Arabia, to become a growing global phenomenon.  During 2006 and early 
2007, ONI carried out empirical testing in forty-one countries.  We have written summaries for each 
of these countries that briefly describe filtering practices and overall political and legal context.  
Additionally, there are eight regional overviews that compare and contrast the targets and strategies 
for regulating Internet content around the world.  These country profiles and regional overviews are 
available at the ONI website: www.opennet.net.  The testing conducted this past year produced the 
first global-level comparison of filtering practices.  This testing establishes a baseline against which 
future filtering can be compared. 
 
The conclusions from this first year of global testing highlight that Internet filtering is growing in 
scope, scale and sophistication worldwide.  At least twenty-five of the forty-one countries ONI 
tested are engaged in some form of technical Internet filtering.  The results of the testing exhibit a 
few principal targets of filtering activity, including political expression, social themes, and topics 
deemed dangerous to national security.  However, very few countries limit their filtering to a 
narrowly defined set of targeted subjects.  Instead, a majority of the countries filter a broad set of 
topics, suggesting that filtering regimes, once put into place, generally expand beyond their initial 
mandate.  
 
The project has also made a number of technological advances in the methodology and tools for 
testing Internet censorship in the field.  Our next steps include finding ways to include more people 
from more places in the research, and conducting more policy-relevant work, including testing for 
accessibility to the Internet during elections. We are set to embark on a major expansion of ONI’s 
research in Asia with the addition of local partners from that region.  
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In future years, ONI will investigate Internet surveillance, and will develop methods to test for 
filtering of content available through “edge locations” (such as cybercafes) and cellular networks, 
including SMS. 
 
A detailed explication of the political, social and technical aspects of filtering will be presented in our 
forthcoming book Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering, to be 
published by MIT Press in late 2007. 
  
 
Filtering Assessments 
 
ONI testing demonstrates that at least twenty-five of the forty-one states studied are engaging in 
technological Internet filtering to some degree.   
 
Filtering by State  
 
Evidence of Filtering Suspected Filtering No Evidence of Filtering 
Azerbaijan Belarus Afghanistan 
Bahrain Kazakhstan Algeria 
Burma/Myanmar  Egypt 
China  Iraq 
Ethiopia  Israel 
India  Kyrgyzstan 
Iran  Malaysia 
Jordan  Moldova 
Libya  Nepal 
Morocco  Russia* 
Oman  Ukraine 
Pakistan  Venezuela 
Saudi Arabia  West Bank/Gaza 
Singapore  Zimbabwe 
South Korea   
Sudan   
Syria   
Tajikistan   
Thailand   
Tunisia   
Turkmenistan   
United Arab Emirates   
Uzbekistan   
Vietnam   
Yemen   
*Testing in Russia was limited to a selection of ISPs in Moscow; these preliminary results 
may not extend beyond this sample.  
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As the chart above reflects, there are a number of countries in which ONI found no evidence of 
filtering.  Within this list are countries that might be considered “anomalies” – places where one 
might think there would be Internet filtering but no evidence of filtering was found.  There are 
other non-technical strategies for controlling Internet content that may be deployed in these 
countries, however.  These strategies include the threat of legal action or arrest; identification, 
licensing and registration requirements for Internet users, content providers and service 
providers; monitoring and surveillance of Internet traffic and users; and informal requests or 
threats by private or public parties. These non-technical means may serve as supplements to or 
substitutes for technological Internet filtering.   
 
The range of blocking behavior varies greatly amongst the countries listed above that filter.  A 
number of countries (eg Azerbaijan, Jordan, and Tajikistan) have exhibited only a few isolated 
incidents of state-sponsored filtering while others have firmly-established, wide-reaching filtering 
regimes.   
 
There are a number of countries in which ONI did not carry out extensive empirical testing, 
including the United States, Canada, Australia, and a number of European countries that are 
known to employ either mandatory filtering regimes, voluntary filtering programs promoted by 
the state, or notice and takedown systems to regulate Internet content.    
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Internet filtering regimes can be characterized by the number of topics that are filtered (the 
breadth of filtering) and the degree to which a given topic is filtered (the depth of filtering). ONI 
found considerable variation in the breadth and depth of filtering across countries. 
 
Filtering: Overall Breadth and Depth 
 
 
 
AE - United Arab Emirates; AZ – Azerbaijan; BH – Bahrain; CN – China; ET – Ethiopia; IR – Iran; JO – Jordan; KR - South Korea; LY – Libya; 
MM – Burma/Myanmar;  OM – Oman; PK – Pakistan; SA - Saudi Arabia; SD – Sudan; SY – Syria; TH – Thailand; TH – Tunisia; UZ – Uzbekistan; 
VN – Vietnam; YE – Yemen.  A number of countries that filter a small number of sites are omitted from this diagram, including Belarus, India, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Singapore, and Tajikistan. 
 
To provide another perspective on testing results from the past year, ONI researchers evaluated 
Internet filtering across four major thematic areas: political content, social content, content 
related to conflict and security, and Internet tools.   
 
· Political content: Content that expresses views in opposition to those of the current 
government. Content more broadly related to human rights, freedom of expression, minority 
rights, and religious movements is also considered here.  
· Social content: Content related to sexuality, gambling, and illegal drugs and alcohol, as well 
as other topics that may be socially sensitive or perceived as offensive, including hate speech.  
· Content related to conflict & security: Content related to armed conflicts, border 
disputes, separatist movements, and militant groups.  
· Internet tools: Web sites that provide e-mail, Internet hosting, search, translation, Voice 
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) telephone service, and circumvention methods are grouped in 
this category. 
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The focus of filtering varies by state, as illustrated below. 
 
Filtering: Content Type 
 
 
 
In addition, ONI has assessed the breadth and depth of filtering within each of the thematic 
areas.  
 
· Pervasive filtering. Filtering that is characterized by both its depth — a blocking regime that 
blocks a large portion of the targeted content in a given category — and its breadth — a 
blocking regime that includes filtering in several categories in a given theme.  
· Substantial filtering. Filtering that has either depth or breadth: either a number of categories 
are subject to a medium level of filtering or a low level of filtering is carried out across many 
categories. 
· Selective filtering. Narrowly targeted filtering that blocks a small number of specific sites 
across a few categories or filtering that targets a single category or issue.  
· Suspected filtering. Connectivity abnormalities are present that suggest the presence of 
filtering, although diagnostic work was unable to confirm conclusively that inaccessible Web 
sites are the result of deliberate actions. 
· No evidence of filtering. ONI testing did not uncover any evidence of Web sites being 
blocked.  
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The table below illustrates the differences in filtering within and across themes. 
 
 
Filtering: Theme and Degree 
 
 Political Social Conflict &  
Security 
Internet 
Tools 
Azerbaijan ?  - - - 
Bahrain ? ?  ?  - ?  
Belarus ?  ?  - - 
Burma/Myanmar ? ? ?  ? ?  ? ?  ? ?  
China ? ? ?  ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ?  
Ethiopia ? ?  ?  ?  ?  
India - - ?  ?  
Iran ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ?  ? ? ?  
Jordan ?  - - - 
Kazakhstan ?  - - - 
Libya ? ?  - - - 
Morocco - - ?  ?  
Oman - ? ? ?  - ? ?  
Pakistan ?  ? ?  ? ? ?  ?  
Saudi Arabia ? ?  ? ? ?  ?  ? ?  
Singapore - ?  - - 
South Korea - ?  ? ? ?  -  
Sudan - ? ? ?  - ? ?  
Syria ? ? ?  ?  ?  ? ?  
Tajikistan ?  - - - 
Thailand ?  ? ?  - ?  
Tunisia ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ?  ? ?  
Turkmenistan ? ?  - - - 
United Arab Emirates ?  ? ? ?  ?  ? ?  
Uzbekistan ? ?  ?  - ?  
Vietnam ? ? ?  ?  - ? ?  
Yemen ?  ? ? ?  ?  ? ?  
 
? ? ?  Pervasive filtering; ? ?  Substantial filtering; ?  Selective filtering;    
?  Suspected filtering;  – no evidence of filtering 
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In addition to variation based on the specific Internet sites blocked, state filtering programs also 
vary in the filtering mechanisms deployed. The choice of locus of filtering – whether centralized 
at the Internet backbone level or decentralized at the ISP level – may affect the consistency of 
filtering within the state. States also vary in their willingness to acknowledge filtering activities 
and to restore access to inappropriately blocked sites.  
 
Filtering: Other Variations 
 
 Locus Consistency Concealed  
Filtering 
Transparency & 
Accountability 
Azerbaijan D Low  Medium 
Bahrain D High Yes Low 
Burma D Low  Medium 
China C & D Medium Yes Low 
Ethiopia C High Yes Low 
India D Medium  High 
Iran D Medium  Medium 
Jordan ? High  Low 
Libya C High  Low 
Morocco C High Yes Low 
Oman C High  High 
Pakistan C & D Medium Yes High 
Saudi Arabia C High  High 
Singapore D High  High 
South Korea D High  High 
Sudan C High  High 
Syria D High  Medium 
Tajikistan D Low  Medium 
Thailand D Medium  Medium 
Tunisia C High Yes Low 
Turkmenistan C High Yes Low 
United Arab 
Emirates D Low  Medium 
Uzbekistan C & D High Yes Low 
Vietnam D Low Yes Low 
Yemen D High  Medium 
 
The Locus  of filtering indicates where Internet traffic is blocked. C indicates that traffic is blocked from a central 
location, presumably the Internet backbone, and affects the entire state equally. D indicates that blocking is 
decentralized, typically meaning that filtering is implemented by ISPs. (Note that this study does not include filtering at 
the institutional level, e.g., cybercafés, universities, or businesses.) ? - indicates the lack of conclusive information. 
Consistency measures the variation in filtering within a country across different ISPs where applicable.  
Concealed filtering reflects either efforts to conceal the fact that filtering is occurring or the failure to clearly indicate 
filtering when it occurs.  
Transparency & Accountability corresponds to the overall level of openness in regard to the practice of filtering.  It 
also considers the presence of concealed filtering, the type of notice given to users regarding blocking, provisions to 
appeal or report instances of inappropriate blocking, and public acknowledgement of filtering policies. 
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Provoking a Dialogue 
 
The prevalence and growth of technical Internet filtering raise serious legal, political and ethical 
concerns.  It is this series of implications that we put on the table for discussion at our first major 
international conference on Internet filtering, held at Oxford on May 18, 2007.   
 
We seek to encourage discussion of the international and public policy implications of these 
findings. The repercussions for the development of human rights around the world are substantial, 
as more and more civic organizations who rely upon the Internet as a primary mode of 
communication have access to information and freedom of speech curtailed, undermining their 
ability to raise awareness and advocate for change.  The importance for the growing community of 
online activists — hacktivists — is even more pronounced, as the flow of bits across the networks 
on which they operate is changing; building software that protects privacy and security online while 
circumventing filtering is now a major challenge for these groups.   
 
For international lawyers, the problems of jurisdiction, choice of law, state sovereignty, and the 
operation of the rule of law once again come into relief in the Internet era, as they did when the 
Internet first came of age in the 1990s.  For multinational technology companies, increasingly called 
upon to carry out Internet filtering and surveillance far from home, these findings hold the prospect 
that the importance of solving their problem of corporate ethics is only growing with each passing 
year.  The findings resonate also for those involved in the international discussion of Internet 
governance and who seek to determine the appropriate role for IGOs and NGOs in the regulation 
of the Internet’s operation.   
 
From the perspective of national policy-making, the decision whether to filter the Internet grows 
more, not less, acute with time.  As the importance of the Internet increases for intelligence, national 
security, and economic development, the tensions that lead to Internet filtering — and that mitigate 
against it — continue to grow.  Ordinary people have much at stake in this debate.  In a growing 
number of states around the world, Internet filtering has huge implications for how connected 
citizens will be to the events unfolding around them, to their own cultures, and to other cultures and 
shared knowledge around the world.  At the same time, filtering practices raise questions about how 
citizens relate to the states in which they live – states that are ordinarily neither transparent about 
how these filtering regimes work nor accountable for the problems inherent in the way they are 
carried out today.  
 
We look forward to joining you in discussion on these and other issues of global significance, in 
person at Oxford and online. 
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